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Abstract
Shocks aﬀecting the rate at which investment goods are transformed into capital stock
have been identiﬁed as a major driver of the business cycle. Such shocks have been linked
to frictions in ﬁnancial markets, because ﬁnancial markets are instrumental in transforming
consumption goods into installed capital. Yet we show that the importance of these invest-
ment shocks is greatly diminished when collateral constraints on ﬁrms are introduced into an
estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. In the presence of binding collat-
eral constraints, risk premium shocks take on a more prominent role as drivers of the business
cycle. Modellers of business cycle ﬂuctuations need to be mindful of the incompatibility of
investment shocks and collateral constraints and of the diﬃculty in specifying ‘structural’
shocks that are robust to modest amendments to the frictions present in a model.
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1 Introduction
Do shocks to investment drive the business cycle? A number of papers over the last decade
suggest that investment shocks account for the majority of the variation in key macroeconomic
aggregates.1 The role of investment shocks has also come into renewed focus following the re-
cent ﬁnancial crisis. Financial intermediation aﬀects the transformation of savings into usable,
installed capital. Likewise, investment shocks aﬀect the economy’s ability to transform con-
sumption goods into productive capital and thus play a parallel role to the process of ﬁnancial
intermediation. Justiniano et al. (2011), for example, draw an explicit link between shocks to
the marginal eﬃciency of investment and credit risk spreads. Credit spreads imply the existence
of a material ﬁnancial friction, yet the model in Justiniano et al. (2011) has no such friction.
Our principal aim in this paper is to investigate the role and transmission mechanism of in-
vestment shocks in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions. More speciﬁcally, we introduce a collateral
constraint, similar to that of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Gerali et al. (2010), into the model
of Smets and Wouters (2007).
Using a data set that extends from 1954Q3 through to 2011Q4 for the United States (US), we
estimate our amended model and compute the contribution of structural shocks to the cyclical
variation of output, investment, consumption and so on. We demonstrate that the introduction
of ﬁnancial frictions in the form of a collateral constraint materially alters which shocks are
thought to be the most important drivers of the business cycle. The intuition behind our result
is simple: a positive investment shock lowers the relative price of capital goods, Tobin’s q, and
leads to an investment boom. However, when entrepreneurs are subject to binding collateral
constraints, a reduction in the value of installed capital reduces the value of collateral and thus
the amount an entrepreneur can borrow. As a result, the initial response of investment to a
positive investment shock is attenuated by the decline in available credit. In the presence of
a collateral constraint, however, the increase in investment cannot be ﬁnanced via increased
1See for example Fisher (2006) and Altig et al. (2011) for evidence from structural vector autoregressions and
Justiniano et al. (2010, 2011) for DSGE based evidence. For an emerging market context see Araujo (2012).
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borrowing and is therefore accompanied by a decline in entrepreneurial consumption. Conse-
quently, investment shocks struggle to generate the positive correlation between consumption
and investment that is observed in the data.
In our model, the shock aﬀecting the cost of borrowing – the risk premium or consumption
shock – is a major driver of cyclical ﬂuctuations in output and other macroeconomic variables.
This risk premium shock accounts for around half of the variation in output and consumption,
and 40 percent of the variation in investment and interest rates. There is also a striking con-
formity between the estimated risk premium shock and the US business cycle.2 The collateral
constraint also has a material eﬀect on the transmission of risk premium shocks. Contrary to
the transmission mechanism of investment shocks described above, a stimulatory risk premium
shock causes demand to rise and Tobin’s q to increase. This implies that entrepreneurs face a
looser borrowing constraint, and thus the impact of the risk premium shock is ampliﬁed for both
consumption and investment.
Like us, Christiano et al. (2011) and Christiano et al. (2014) observe that the contribution
of IST shocks to the variance of GDP is diminished when a ﬁnancial friction is introduced
into the model. Our work diﬀers from those papers in two main respects. First, we have a
collateral constraint rather than an external ﬁnance premium as our ﬁnancial friction. Second,
in the above papers the IST shock remains an important driver of GDP dynamics except when
ﬁnancial variables are included as observables, whereas in our model – even with just the standard
Smets-Wouters observables – the contribution of the IST shock to cyclical dynamics is largely
annihilated.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the model used in
the analysis. The model closely follows that of Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano et al.
(2010), but we add impatient entrepreneurs who are collateral constrained. Section 3 discusses
the estimation of the model. Section 4 looks at the role of investment speciﬁc technology (IST)
and risk premium shocks as cyclical drivers.3 In section 5 and section 6, we discuss the results
2See Figure 2.
3We refer to investment specific technology shocks in the spirit of Smets and Wouters (2007). Other authors
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of our paper and their robustness.
2 Model
Our model is based on the familiar New Keynesian model put forward by Smets and Wouters
(2007). Households consume (and save) and supply labour. The household income that under-
pins consumption and saving is obtained from wages, and from dividend streams from owning
the ﬁrms that produce ﬁnal goods. Households smooth consumption over time by investing in
deposits issued by competitive ﬁnancial intermediaries. The model has various nominal and real
frictions including price and wage rigidities (with backward inﬂation indexation), habit forma-
tion in consumption, and adjustment costs for investment. The model also has variable capital
utilization and ﬁxed costs.
We modify the baseline Smets-Wouters model by introducing entrepreneurial agents who
are subject to a borrowing constraint.4 Introducing an additional agent into the model provides
scope for borrowing and lending in the steady state. We assume that borrowing is limited to a
fraction χ of the present value of the future capital stock owned by the entrepreneur. Mendoza
(2006) provides a general speciﬁcation for collateral constraints nesting the one employed in our
paper. Our approach is similar to the ‘margin constraint’ in Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), which
hinges on the value of capital owned. Debt is one-period, so the stock of capital ﬁnanced by
household lending to the entrepreneurs needs to to be re-ﬁnanced each period.
We adopt a borrowing constraint because it is a parsimonious ﬁnancial friction, and has a
pedigree in theoretical models dating back to at least Kiyotaki and Moore (1997). Furthermore,
empirical evidence indicates that collateralization of debt is ubiquitous (see for example Berger
and Udell 1990, Harhoﬀ and Korting 1998 and Jimenez et al. 2006); collateral requirements are
consistent with the notion that entrepreneurs’ borrowing capacity is constrained by the value of
(such as Justiniano et al. 2011) make a distinction between IST shocks, which affect the transformation of
consumption goods into investment, and shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment (MEI shocks), which
affect the transformation of investment into productive capital.
4Lombardo and McAdam (2012) also introduce borrowing constraints into the Smets-Wouters model, but in
their model, the constraint binds for households, while firms are subject to costly state verification.
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their assets.
Entrepreneurs are responsible for all investment. We assume that entrepreneurs have a higher
rate of time preference than households and are therefore more impatient. The entrepreneurs’
impatience causes the collateral constraint to be binding even in steady state, unlike Mendoza
(2008). Entrepreneurial impatience means that entrepreneurs can beneﬁcially exchange current
consumption for future consumption by borrowing from households. This intertemporal substi-
tution is enabled by investment in capital goods. All agents, both households and entrepreneurs,
are subject to the same stochastic shocks, and thus there is no idiosyncratic risk to insure away.
As discussed by Iacoviello (2005), the return to investment exceeds the return to savings so that
the collateral constraint is binding, but we do not want entrepreneurs to postpone consumption
to self-fund all of the desired investment, which is prevented by the entrepreneur’s impatience.
Entrepreneurs are the agents who own the capital stock. They ﬁnance consumption and
investment expenditure by renting out capital goods to ﬁnal goods producers and through bor-
rowing from households, via notional ﬁnancial intermediaries.
In our description of the model below, we limit our discussion to those parts of the model
that diﬀer from Smets and Wouters (2007), focusing on the decision problems of households and
entrepreneurs. A full set of linearized model equations is presented in Appendix A.
2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes the following utility function:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
1
1− σc
(Cj,t+s − hCt−1+s)
1−σc exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σl
L1+σlj,t+s
)]
(1)
subject to
Cj,t +
Bj,t
Pt
= Πj,t +Wj,tLj,t +
Rft−1
πt
Bj,t−1
Pt−1
(2)
The jth household maximizes utility by choosing consumption at time t, Cj,t, and hours worked
Lj,t. β is the discount factor; h dictates the degree of habit persistence; σl is the elasticity of
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substitution with respect to the real wage; and σc in conjunction with the habit term determines
the intertemporal substitution elasticity for households. The ﬂow constraint has consumption
and real deposits (Bj,t/Pt) equal to proﬁts, Πj,t, labour income (real wages Wj,t multiplied by
hours worked) and the value of real deposits from last period scaled up by the gross eﬀective
nominal interest rate Rft−1 divided by the gross inﬂation rate, πt. The gross eﬀective nominal
interest rate is deﬁned as Rft ≡ Rtεc,t where εc,t is a risk premium shock, as in Smets and
Wouters (2007), and Rt is the gross risk free policy rate.
The household’s ﬁrst order conditions for consumption and deposits are summarized by the
following set equations. The marginal utility of consumption at time t, denoted λt, is:
λj,t = exp
(
σc − 1
1 + σl
L1+σlj,t
)
(Cj,t − hCt−1)
−σc . (3)
The Euler equation for households can then be represented as:
λj,t = βEt
(
λj,t+1
Rft
πt+1
)
(4)
The savings, or deposits of the household, Bt/Pt, are lent to entrepreneurs, who use these
funds to purchase capital goods. These capital goods are rented out to ﬁnal goods-producing
ﬁrms (which are in turn owned by the households).
2.2 Entrepreneurs
The representative entrepreneur maximizes the expected utility:
Et
∞∑
s=0
βse
[
1
1− σe
(Cej,t+s − heC
e
t−1+s)
1−σe
]
(5)
where Ce denotes entrepreneurial consumption. Entrepreneurs are subject to the following
budget constraint:
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Cej,t +QtKj,t =
Bj,t
Pt
−
Rft−1
πt
Bj,t−1
Pt−1
+RktZtKj,t−1 − a(Zt)Kj,t−1 +Qt(1− δ)Kj,t−1 +Π
e
t (6)
In each period, the entrepreneur purchases consumption goods Cej,t and new capital stock, Kj,t,
at price Qt. These purchases are ﬁnanced by net borrowing from households (
Bj,t
Pt
−
R
f
t−1
pit
Bj,t−1
Pt−1
),
rental income on capital goods net of capital utilization costs (RktZtKj,t−1 − a(Zt)Kj,t−1), the
proceeds from selling last period’s capital stock net of depreciation (Qt(1− δ)Kj,t−1), and proﬁt
from the intermediate production of capital (Πet ). Because entrepreneurs are more impatient
than households, they face the following borrowing constraint on their degree of leverage:
Rft
πt+1
Bj,t
Pt
= χEtQt+1Kj,t (7)
where χ is the loan-to-value ratio (LVR), which dictates the maximum permissible leverage ratio.
This constraint is on the future value of capital, hence EtQt+1, because any default and required
loan recovery will occur in the future. Because of the assumption that β > βe, the constraint is
always binding in the neighborhood of the steady state.
The optimality conditions for the entrepreneur’s consumption, borrowing, capital purchases,
and capital utilization are as follows:
(Cej,t − heC
e
t−1)
−σe
− λej,t = 0 (8)
λej,t − βeEtλ
e
j,t+1
Rft
πt+1
− λBj,t
Rft
πt+1
= 0 (9)
Qt =
λBj,t
λej,t
χQt+1 + βeEt
λej,t+1
λej,t
[
Rkt+1Zt+1 − a(Zt+1) +Qt+1(1− δ)
]
(10)
Rkt = a
′(Zt) (11)
where λe and λB are the Lagrange multipliers on the ﬂow and borrowing constraints respectively,
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Rkt is the return on capital and Zt is capital utilization.
The presence of λB in the ﬁrst order conditions represents the eﬀects of the borrowing
constraint on entrepreneurs’ allocation of consumption and capital purchases. Consider, for ex-
ample, a case where the borrowing constraint is exogenously relaxed. This results in a decline
in the shadow value of the constraint, λB. For constant real interest rates, the Euler equation
suggests that a looser borrowing constraint would be associated with higher consumption. Like-
wise, for a constant path of the eﬀective interest rate, a looser borrowing constraint implies a
higher value of installed capital, Q, and thus higher investment.
2.2.1 Capital producers
The capital stock is produced by ﬁrms, wholly owned by the entrepreneurs. The jth represen-
tative capital-producing ﬁrm maximizes the following proﬁt function:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λet+s [Qt+s∆xj,t+s − Ij,t+s] (12)
where Λet is the stochastic discount factor of the owner, in this case the entrepreneur, and net
capital accumulation is deﬁned as:
∆xj,t = Kj,t − (1− δ)Kj,t−1 = εµ,t(1− S(Ij,t, Ij,t−1))Ij,t (13)
where δ is the depreciation rate, εµ,t is an investment-speciﬁc shock, and the function S(Ij,t, Ij,t−1))Ij,t
captures investment adjustment costs. The investment adjustment cost function is quadratic in
the ratio of investment to its lag. Substituting (13) into (12) yields:
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λet+s [Qt+sεµ,t+s(1− S(Ij,t+s, Ij,t+s−1))Ij,t+s − Ij,t+s] (14)
Assuming that the adjustment cost function S(Ij,t, Ij,t−1) takes the form
κ
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− γ
)2
, where
γ is the gross steady state growth rate of the economy, the optimality condition for investment
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is given by:
1 = Qtεµ,t
[(
1−
κ
2
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− γ
)2)
− κ
(
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
− γ
)
Ij,t
Ij,t−1
]
(15)
+ βeEt
λet+1
λet
Qt+1εµ,t+1
[
κ
(
Ij,t+1
Ij,t
− γ
)(
Ij,t+1
Ij,t
)2]
Adjustment costs dampen the response of investment to various shocks and play an important
role in the dynamics of Tobin’s q – the relative price of ﬁrms’ collateral in our model.
2.3 The rest of the model
The rest of the model directly follows Smets and Wouters (2007) and thus we only provide a
very brief description. A complete set of linearized model equations is presented in Table 8 in
Appendix A.
Output of ﬁnal goods is a function of eﬀective capital, labour and technology. Final goods
producers rent capital services with a given degree of utilization from entrepreneurs, and labour
services from household unions.
Goods and labour markets are monopolistically competitive with both prices and wages being
set in a time-dependent manner as put forward by Calvo (1983), albeit with partial indexation
to past inﬂation for those price and wage setters not called upon to re-price in a given time
period.
Government spending is simply modelled as a stochastic share of GDP. Monetary policy is
modelled by a generalized Taylor-type interest rate rule that links the current period policy rate
to its lag, to deviations of the current period inﬂation rate from target, to deviations in the
output gap, and to changes in the growth rate of the output gap.
The output gap is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between output in the sticky price allocation of
the model and output corresponding to a ﬂexible price allocation. In the ﬂexible price allocation
there are no nominal rigidities in either price or wage setting, and hence there is no role for
monetary policy.
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2.4 Shocks
There are seven shocks perturbing the economy. The risk premium (εc,t) and investment speciﬁc
technology shock (εµ,t), discussed above, are augmented with shocks to total factor productivity
(εa,t), the share of government spending in GDP (εg,t), the interest rate rule (εr,t), and shocks
to the price and wage Phillips curves (εp,t and εw,t).
5 These shocks all exhibit some degree of
persistence, as described in the following equations:
εc,t = ρcεc,t−1 + ζc,t (16)
εµ,t = ρµεµ,t−1 + ζµ,t (17)
εa,t = ρaεa,t−1 + ζa,t (18)
εg,t = ρgεg,t−1 + ζg,t + ρ(g,a)ζa,t (19)
εr,t = ρrεr,t−1 + ζr,t (20)
εp,t = ρpεp,t−1 + ζp,t − ρ(p,ζ)ζp,t−1 (21)
εw,t = ρwεw,t−1 + ζw,t − ρ(w,ζ)ζw,t−1 (22)
The various autoregressive and moving average (MA) coeﬃcients are represented by ρ. Following
Smets and Wouters (2007), we include a feedback term between the innovation in technology
and government spending, ρ(g,a), in the shock term for exogenous government spending, as well
as MA terms in the price and wage shocks to capture high frequency ﬂuctuations in price and
wage dynamics. The innovations ζj,t are normal, independent and identically distributed.
2.5 An alternative model
To isolate the eﬀects of borrowing constraints on the business cycle, we estimate two versions
of our model: the model presented above, and an alternative model where entrepreneurs are
identical to households in terms of their rate of time preference and thus do not face borrowing
5The flexible price allocation used to construct the output gap is not affected by either εr,t, εp,t or εw,t.
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constraints. This alternative is essentially the model put forward by Smets and Wouters (2007).
3 Bayesian estimation
The following seven observables are used to estimate the two versions of the model: the growth
rates of GDP, aggregate consumption, and investment; real wages; inﬂation; the short-term
nominal interest rate; and hours worked. Given that we have seven stochastic shocks in the
model, we avoid stochastic singularity. The data used to estimate the models are described
in Appendix B. We denote ‘aggregate’ consumption as Ca since it corresponds to the sum
of household and entrepreneurial consumption in our model. As in Justiniano et al. (2010),
consumption corresponds to private consumption of non-durable goods, while investment is
deﬁned as the sum of gross domestic private investment and consumption of durable goods.
The models are estimated using standard Bayesian techniques. For the most part the priors for
the model are the same as those employed by Smets and Wouters. There are two innocuous
caveats to this statement. First, we use a Gamma prior instead of a Normal prior for the labour-
disutility parameter, σl, though with the same mean and variance used in Smets and Wouters.
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Second, we estimate the household’s discount rate using a Gamma prior with a mean of 0.25
and a standard deviation of 0.1, though the data are found to be somewhat uninformative for
these priors. Other authors such as Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010) calibrate
this parameter directly.
The model with borrowing constraints has two parameters without analogues in the original
Smets-Wouters model: (i) the loan-to-value ratio, χ, and (ii) the gap between the discount
rates of the households and entrepreneurs, β˜. Given that the LVR is a device to ensure that
entrepreneur’s have equity in their investment ventures, the LVR is assumed to fall within (0,1).
More speciﬁcally the prior for the LVR is a Beta distribution with mean 0.5 and standard
deviation of 0.15. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) calibrate the LVR to be 0.85, suggesting that it is
6In estimation over a smaller sub-sample, positive probability mass was assigned to negative parameter values,
which we rule out on a priori theoretical grounds.
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diﬃcult to estimate without data on debt and housing holdings of credit-constrained households.
Our mean posterior parameter estimates for the LVR are close to our prior value of 0.51, but
the data are somewhat informative, indicating that the probability mass should be more tightly
grouped around the mean value. When taking the model to a shortened data sample, ending
before the beginning of the Great Recession, we obtain a posterior mean of 0.54 for the same
prior.
The prior distribution for the discount rate gap, β˜, is a Gamma distribution with a mean of
1 and a standard deviation of 0.5. This prior distribution implicitly encompasses the calibrated
discount factors for impatient borrowers used in Iacoviello (2005) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010),
which range from 0.98 to 0.97. Gerali et al. (2010) estimate a similar model, but do not attempt
to estimate either χ or β˜. Iacoviello provides greater discussion of plausible discount factors, and
cites a number of papers on cross-sectional variation in discount factors (Carroll and Samwick
1997, for example, suggest that the plausible range for discount factors is between 0.91 and 0.99).
While our prior range does not fully encompass this cross-sectional variation we think it provides
a suﬃciently broad range for what one might assume is the average impatient entrepreneur.
Finally, we calibrate the depreciation rate to 0.025 and the share of government spending in
GDP to 0.22. Following Smets and Wouters (2007), we set the Kimball aggregator parameters,
ǫp and ǫw, to 10 and calibrate the steady state wage mark-up to 1.5.
Tables 1 and 2 report the posterior mean and 90 percent posterior probability intervals for the
structural parameters and the standard deviations of the shocks for the model with and without
collateral constraints. The reported parameter estimates for the models are based on 900,000
draws of Markov chains. ‘Trace-plots’ of deciles from the two Markov chains are available from
the authors upon request.
The posterior estimates for the common structural parameters in the two models are broadly
similar. They suggest a high degree of nominal price and wage rigidity, a signiﬁcant degree of
habit persistence and sluggish investment adjustment. Diﬀerences between the two models arise
primarily in the size and persistence of investment and risk premium shocks. In the presence
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of borrowing constraints, investment shocks become more volatile but less persistent. Risk
premium shocks, however, are estimated to be less volatile but more persistent. Introducing
borrowing constraints also lowers the mean of the posterior estimates of the capital utilization
and investment adjustment cost parameters, relative to the model without borrowing constraints.
The additional structure that we have introduced with the two agent types and the borrowing
constraint has come at a cost. Like Brzoza-Brzezina and Kolasa (2013), we ﬁnd that empirical
ﬁt is adversely aﬀected by the introduction of the borrowing constraint. Estimates of the (log)
marginal data densities of the models with and without the borrowing constraint are reported
in Table 3.7 The modiﬁed harmonic mean estimate is based on an average of the draws from
the Markov chains, and the Laplace estimate is based on a second order approximation of that
log marginal data density (which approximates the data density using a Normal distribution).
Bayes factors can be computed from these log marginal data densities, which can then be used
to compare the two models (Kass and Raftery, 1995). Kass and Raftery’s guidelines to assess
the log Bayes factor imply that the data strongly support the model without the borrowing
constraint.8
What we demonstrate below is that IST shocks are incompatible with borrowing constraints,
as implemented in the model. However, to explain ﬁnancial frictions empirically, alternative
structural assumptions are needed, or additional features are required to rehabilitate the model
with borrowing constraints.
4 IST and risk premium shocks and the business cycle
This section analyzes the key drivers of the business cycle by looking at the variance decompo-
sition of the observables in both version of the model. Table 4 reports the contribution of each
structural shock to the volatility of the observables for the version of the model without the
borrowing constraint. The dominant role of IST shocks highlighted by Justiniano et al. (2010)
7See also Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2013).
8If 2 loge(B01) > 10 then the evidence is considered to be ‘very strong’ in favour of model 0, where B01 is the
marginal data density of model zero divided by the marginal data density of model one.
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is replicated in this version of the model as 55% of the variance of output growth is accounted
for by IST shocks. Risk premium, neutral technology and government spending shocks jointly
make up another 30% of the variance of output growth. IST shocks also account for almost
all (91%) of the variance of investment growth and a large part of the variance of the nominal
interest rate (43%).
In this model IST shocks are particularly important in capturing the decline in output that
occurred during the Great Recession. Figure 1 shows the path of output growth when the model
is driven solely by IST shocks. Here, IST shocks account for over half of the drop in output
growth during the last recession. The premise of our paper is that this result is not robust to
the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions in the form of borrowing constraints.
Introducing a borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs aﬀects the transmission mechanism of
IST shocks and thus their relative contribution to the volatility of GDP. The variance decom-
position of the observables in Table 5 illustrates that in the model with borrowing constraints,
the role of IST shocks is greatly reduced. Apart from consumption and investment, IST shocks
account for less than 5% of the volatility of the observable variables. Their contribution to the
dynamics of investment remains signiﬁcant but almost two thirds less than in the model with-
out the borrowing constraint. The higher share of IST shocks in the volatility of consumption
reﬂects these shocks’ role in the dynamics of entrepreneurial consumption. In section 4.1, we
examine this channel in more detail.
In the model with the borrowing constraint, the main driver of business cycle ﬂuctuations
appears to be the risk premium, contributing between 39% and 47% to the variance of the
components of GDP. Adding a borrowing constraint also increases the share of risk premium
shocks in the variance of total hours and nominal interest rates.
Given its importance in shaping business cycle dynamics, we now examine how the risk pre-
mium shock evolves over the business cycle. Figure 2 plots the posterior mean of our estimated
risk premium shock and the NBER recession dates which start at the peak of a business cycle
and end at the trough. The sample includes every recession from the late 1950s onwards. There
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is a striking conformity of the risk premium shock with these recessions. At the beginning of
each recession the estimated risk premium shock rises sharply, implying that the eﬀective in-
terest rate in the model is highly countercyclical. Moreover, the risk premium and the eﬀective
interest rate start to rise before the peak of the boom, in almost every recession in our sample.
The increase in our measure of the risk premium shock is most pronounced during the last
recession. Figure 3 illustrates the role of risk premium shocks over the last decade and a half
by simulating the path of output assuming that the model is only driven by the estimated risk
premium shock. Most of the drop in output growth in the last recession is due to the variation
in the risk premium shock. This is in line with the observation that the last recession was driven
by sharp disruptions in the ﬁnancial system resulting in higher interest rate spreads.
4.1 IST shocks and collateral constraints
The following two sections ﬂesh out the intuition behind our results starting with the role of IST
shocks. In a real business cycle type model, investment rises but consumption falls following a
positive IST shock (see for example Barro and King 1984). A shock that increases the marginal
eﬃciency of investment raises the incentive to invest by more than can be accommodated by an
increase in labour eﬀort. As a result, investment can only increase suﬃciently if consumption
falls. This GDP-consumption co-movement puzzle precludes IST shocks from being a key driver
of the business cycle in this type of model. Justiniano et al. (2010) show how this co-movement
puzzle can be overcome through a combination of nominal and real rigidities plus variable capital
utilization.9 As a result, their model is able to generate a dominant role for IST shocks over
the business cycle, although these shocks have a limited role in accounting for consumption
movements. All the features that account for the co-movement puzzle in Justiniano et al. are
also present in our model, in addition to the binding borrowing constraint on entrepreneurs.
Figure 4 shows the impulse response functions following an IST shock in our estimated model.
9Greenwood et al. (2000) and more recently Furlanetto and Seneca (2014) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011),
discuss a number of ways in which the positive co-movement of consumption and investment can be derived,
including non-separable preferences, habit persistence and factor immobility, intratemporal adjustment costs on
investment, and intermediate inputs.
16
The solid lines show the median response and the shaded areas the 90% conﬁdence intervals. As
Figure 4 makes clear, there is no co-movement puzzle between GDP and household consump-
tion. However, aggregate consumption declines because of a sharp adjustment to entrepreneurs’
consumption in the wake of a positive IST shock. A positive IST shock reduces the value of
Tobin’s q (this is true even in a simple RBC model without adjustment costs where 1 = Qtεµ,t)
and thus the value of the capital stock used for collateral. The decline in the value of collateral,
other things equal, reduces the ﬁrm’s ability to borrow just when the demand for borrowing
coming from investment is high. As a result, investment is reduced relative to the case without
borrowing constraints, and entrepreneurs’ consumption falls. In terms of the entrepreneur’s
Euler equation, (9), a decline in Tobin’s q tightens the borrowing constraint causing λet to rise,
which, other things equal, causes entrepreneurial consumption to fall. In the estimated model
entrepreneurs’ consumption falls by enough to lead to a decline in aggregate consumption.
4.2 Risk premium shocks and borrowing constraints
The volatilities of observed variables ultimately stem from some underlying structural shocks.
In the context of the model with borrowing constraints, the risk premium shocks supplant
investment shocks. The same channel that reduces the impact of IST shocks contributes to the
increase in the importance of risk premium shocks. Figure 5 shows the transmission mechanism
of a risk premium shock. A negative risk premium shock lowers the eﬀective interest rates faced
by household and entrepreneurs. This results in higher consumption and output, generating
an increased demand for investment and a higher price of capital. From the perspective of
entrepreneurs, even in the absence of any borrowing constraint, the lower cost of servicing their
debt allows them to increase both their consumption and capital purchases.
The additional asset price channel (higher Tobin’s q) implies that they also face a looser bor-
rowing constraint (both λet and εc,t decline in equation (9) causing entrepreneurial consumption
to rise). This engenders an ampliﬁcation of the impact of risk premium shocks for both, con-
sumption and investment. As the response of interest rates and inﬂation are positive, our model
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generates positive co-movement between macroeconomic aggregates following a risk premium
shock.
Our analysis shows that the introduction of the borrowing constraint alters the transmission
mechanisms of both IST and risk premium shocks. The borrowing constraint attenuates the
expansionary eﬀects of IST shocks on output, whereas the impact of risk premium shocks is
ampliﬁed.
5 Discussion
Our analysis suggests that risk premium shocks, or shocks to the eﬀective interest rate faced by
households and ﬁrms, are the main driver of the business cycle. This result is attributable to the
role played by simple ﬁnancial frictions in the form of borrowing constraints. An expansionary
risk premium shock loosens the borrowing constraint faced by entrepreneurs and thus reduces
the cost of transforming household savings into productive capital.
Justiniano et al. (2011), in a model without explicit ﬁnancial frictions, attribute this role to
IST shocks. A positive IST shock raises the marginal eﬃciency of investment and thus the rate
with which household savings are transformed into productive capital. As a supply type shock,
a positive IST shock also yields a decline in the price of capital. In the presence of borrowing
constraints, the counter-cyclical asset price movement tends to tighten the borrowing constraint
and this mechanism reduces the contribution of IST shocks.
Christensen and Dib (2008), and more recently Merola (2015) compare models with and
without a ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism, where ﬁrms’ net worth aﬀects the ‘external ﬁnance
premium’ and thus the ﬁrms’ costs of borrowing. Even though there are signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between their approach and ours (in terms of sample period, model and estimation technique),
they too ﬁnd that the role of IST shocks in the forecast variance of GDP diminishes in the
presence of ﬁnancial frictions, albeit to a much lesser extent. The ﬁnancial friction in Christensen
and Dib (2008) has a mild eﬀect on the transmission mechanism quantitatively, but the dynamics
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are qualitatively unchanged. In our model, ﬁnancial frictions reverse the short term impact of
IST shocks on aggregate consumption, and thus have both quantitative and qualitative eﬀects
on the response of output.
A number of recent papers in the literature view the ﬁnancial sector as a source of shocks
driving the business cycle. For example, Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) show in a Bernanke et al.
(1999) type model that shocks to entrepreneurial net worth play a key role in the dynamics
of GDP. Christiano et al. (2014) estimates a modiﬁed ﬁnancial accelerator model where the
volatility of idiosyncratic shocks in the ﬁnancial accelerator mechanism is treated as a stochastic
process. This risk shock is shown to account for a large proportion of the volatility of GDP when
the model is estimated on ﬁnancial data. As in our analysis, the contribution of investment
shocks declines, once risk shocks are introduced. Hirakata et al. (2011) also introduce shocks to
ﬁnancial intermediation in a BGG-type model and ﬁnd shocks to ﬁnancial intermediation play
an important role in the dynamics of investment, in particular accounting for the collapse of
investment during the ﬁnancial crisis. Jermann and Quadrini (2012) investigate the importance
of shocks originating in the ﬁnancial sector when ﬁrms face borrowing constraints. As in the
previous literature, these ﬁnancial shocks are found to be quantitatively important.
In relation to this literature, our results highlight the importance of risk premium shocks.
Although this type of shock is present in canonical DSGE models such as Smets and Wouters
(2007), its role as a driver of the business cycle only comes to the fore once we introduce the
borrowing constraint. In contrast to Christiano et al. (2014), our risk premium shock becomes
important in the presence of ﬁnancial frictions without using ﬁnancial data in the estimation
of the model. Amano and Shukayev (2012) also ﬁnd that risk premium shocks play a key role,
and are particularly important in driving an economy towards the zero lower bound on nominal
interest rates.
Our results share some similarities with Iacoviello (2005), who points out that, in a model
with real estate investments, the eﬀects of borrowing constraints on the ampliﬁcation of shocks
depend on the response of asset prices and consumer price inﬂation. In his framework, where
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household debt is denominated in nominal terms, shocks that generate a negative correlation
between inﬂation and output (such as supply shocks), are decelerated while the impact of demand
shocks are ampliﬁed. Our contribution extends this channel to the case of investment shocks.
6 Robustness over the sample
This section analyzes the robustness of our results to alternative sample periods. Our baseline
estimation period runs from 1954Q3 through to 2011Q4 and therefore encompasses the estima-
tion periods of, amongst others, Justiniano et al. (2010, 2011) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
This estimation period spans at least two recent episodes that have the potential to aﬀect our
results: the Financial Crisis and the post 2009Q1 period where the zero lower bound for the
federal funds rate becomes binding. To check for the robustness of our results, we re-estimate
the model for the 1954Q3 to 2006Q4 period.
Tables 6 and 7 present the estimation results and variance decomposition for this alternative
sample. Our parameter estimates are broadly consistent with those obtained in the baseline
estimation, suggesting that our results are not unduly driven by the ﬁnancial crisis or the zero
lower bound period.
The main conclusion regarding the drivers of the business cycle remains unchanged. In the
context of the model with borrowing constraints, the risk premium shock remains the dominant
driver of the volatility in the components of GDP.
7 Conclusion
At the heart of our paper is an identiﬁcation problem that aﬀects the interpretation of the
key drivers of the business cycle. We demonstrate that the introduction of ﬁnancial frictions
materially alters which shocks are thought to be the most important drivers of the business
cycle. When entrepreneurs are subject to binding collateral constraints, a reduction in the value
of installed capital reduces the value of collateral and thus the amount an entrepreneur can
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borrow. We ﬁnd that the dynamic responses of output and consumption to a positive investment
shock are materially altered by such collateral constraints. While an investment shock prompts
more investment and positive output growth, the behaviour of consumption is completely altered,
since the impact eﬀect is for consumption to fall. The investment shock causes collateral values
to decline, which reduces entrepreneurs’ ability to obtain external ﬁnance. Thus, to increase
investment entrepreneurs are forced to reduce their consumption. Investment shocks can then no
longer generate the positive co-movement that is evident between consumption and investment.
Instead, in the model with collateral constraints, risk premium shocks increase markedly in
importance, whereas shocks to investment have a much diminished role, contributing only 4%
of the variation in output.
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Figure 1: Role of IST shock in the Great Recession in the model without borrowing constraints
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Notes: The solid line labelled Data shows the year-on-year growth rate of GDP. The solid-crossed line, labelled
IST shocks only, shows the growth rate of GDP that would have occurred if only the estimated IST shocks assume
non-zero values. The estimated shocks are obtained via the Kalman smoother on the estimated posterior mean
of the Smets-Wouters model with no borrowing constraints.
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Figure 2: The risk-premium shock and NBER recession intervals in the model with borrowing
constraints
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Notes: The solid line shows the estimated risk premium shocks for the model with the borrowing constraint. The
estimated shocks are obtained via the Kalman smoother on the estimated posterior mean. The shaded areas
correspond to the NBER recession intervals.
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Figure 3: Role of Risk Premium shock in the Great Recession in the model with borrowing
constraints
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Notes: The solid line labelled Data shows the year-on-year growth rate of GDP. The solid-crossed line, labelled
Risk premium shocks only, shows the growth rate of GDP that would have occurred if only the estimated Risk
premium shocks assume non-zero values. The estimated shocks are obtained via the Kalman smoother on the
estimated posterior mean of the model with the borrowing constraint.
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Figure 4: Impulse response to an IST shock in the model with borrowing constraints
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Notes: The solid lines are impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock. The solid line is
the posterior median, the shaded areas correspond to the 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. Responses are
measured as the percentage deviations from trend except for inflation and interest rates, which are measured as
the percentage point deviation from steady state values.
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Figure 5: Impulse response to a risk premium shock in the model with borrowing constraints
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Notes: The solid lines are impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock. The solid line is
the posterior median, the shaded areas correspond to the 90% Bayesian confidence intervals. Responses are
measured as the percentage deviations from trend except for inflation and interest rates, which are measured as
the percentage point deviation from steady state values.
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Table 1: Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model with borrowing con-
straints: 1954Q3 - 2011Q4
Parameter Description Prior Mean StdDev Mean (5% 95%)
α Share of capital N 0.300 0.050 0.275 0.212 0.340
φ Investment adjustment cost parameter N 4.000 1.500 2.579 1.612 3.516
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.033 0.979 1.087
σcE Entrepreneur’s intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.322 0.779 1.845
h habit parameter of consumers β 0.700 0.100 0.905 0.875 0.937
hE habit parameter of entrepreneurs β 0.700 0.100 0.811 0.750 0.873
θw Calvo wage parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.875 0.819 0.937
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ 2.000 0.750 0.821 0.382 1.214
θp Calvo price parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.872 0.833 0.909
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β 0.500 0.150 0.304 0.192 0.411
φp Markup (goods) N 1.250 0.125 1.297 1.202 1.393
δw Wage indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.391 0.213 0.567
δp Price indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.193 0.082 0.298
φpi Taylor rule inﬂation N 1.500 0.250 1.899 1.619 2.187
φr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β 0.750 0.100 0.853 0.818 0.889
φx Taylor rule output gap N 0.125 0.050 0.074 0.044 0.106
φ∆x Taylor rule output gap growth rate N 0.125 0.050 0.245 0.210 0.282
π Steady state inﬂation Γ 0.625 0.100 0.835 0.734 0.943
100(1−β)
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ 0.250 0.100 0.250 0.092 0.398
ltv Loan to value ratio β 0.500 0.150 0.510 0.322 0.709
β˜ Entrepreneurs discount less househlds Γ 1.000 0.500 0.985 0.222 1.717
lss Log steady state hours N 0.000 2.000 -0.580 -2.628 1.504
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N 0.400 0.100 0.470 0.443 0.495
ρa AR parameter technology shock β 0.500 0.200 0.970 0.960 0.982
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β 0.500 0.200 0.866 0.827 0.904
ρg AR parameter exogenous demand shock β 0.500 0.200 0.990 0.982 0.997
ρi AR parameter investment shock β 0.500 0.200 0.192 0.123 0.264
ρr AR parameter interest rate β 0.500 0.200 0.134 0.051 0.212
ρp AR parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.945 0.906 0.982
ρw AR parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.957 0.928 0.988
ρep MA parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.888 0.818 0.954
ρew MA parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.934 0.897 0.972
ρga Eﬀect of tech shock on exog. demand N 0.500 0.200 0.359 0.280 0.434
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.387 0.341 0.430
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.258 0.230 0.285
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.141 0.122 0.160
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.216 0.197 0.236
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.548 0.501 0.592
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 2.199 1.807 2.610
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.344 0.315 0.373
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a Normal (N), Beta (β), Gamma (Γ), or inverse-Gamma (Γ−1) distribution.
Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior distribution, and the final three columns
report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits of 90% Bayesian confidence intervals from the posterior
distribution.
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Table 2: Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model without borrowing
constraints: 1954Q3 - 2011Q4
Parameter Description Prior Mean StdDev Mean (5% 95%)
α Share of capital N 0.300 0.050 0.126 0.055 0.198
φ Investment adjustment cost parameter N 4.000 1.500 4.882 3.235 6.548
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.358 1.205 1.499
h habit parameter of consumers β 0.700 0.100 0.759 0.686 0.826
θw Calvo wage parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.811 0.751 0.876
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ 2.000 0.750 1.363 0.644 2.125
θp Calvo price parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.765 0.716 0.818
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β 0.500 0.150 0.711 0.567 0.840
φp Markup (goods) N 1.250 0.125 1.291 1.195 1.381
δw Wage indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.576 0.385 0.765
δp Price indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.225 0.111 0.334
φpi Taylor rule inﬂation N 1.500 0.250 1.896 1.660 2.124
φr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β 0.750 0.100 0.797 0.759 0.836
φx Taylor rule output gap N 0.125 0.050 0.076 0.049 0.103
φ∆x Taylor rule output gap growth rate N 0.125 0.050 0.211 0.171 0.251
π Steady state inﬂation Γ 0.625 0.100 0.871 0.768 0.975
100(1−β)
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ 0.250 0.100 0.245 0.090 0.380
lss Log steady state hours N 0.000 2.000 -0.538 -2.400 1.327
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N 0.400 0.100 0.450 0.420 0.482
ρa AR parameter technology shock β 0.500 0.200 0.981 0.971 0.989
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β 0.500 0.200 0.507 0.365 0.647
ρg AR parameter exogenous demand shock β 0.500 0.200 0.986 0.978 0.994
ρi AR parameter investment shock β 0.500 0.200 0.695 0.611 0.783
ρr AR parameter interest rate β 0.500 0.200 0.256 0.152 0.367
ρp AR parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.964 0.942 0.985
ρw AR parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.962 0.941 0.986
ρep MA parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.820 0.744 0.910
ρew MA parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.921 0.882 0.962
ρga Eﬀect of tech shock on exog. demand N 0.500 0.200 0.256 0.192 0.323
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 1.427 0.801 1.974
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.261 0.234 0.289
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.121 0.100 0.142
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.210 0.192 0.228
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.565 0.518 0.615
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.967 0.836 1.109
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.320 0.294 0.344
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a Normal (N), Beta (β), Gamma (Γ), or inverse-Gamma (Γ−1) distribution.
Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior distribution, and the final three columns
report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits of 90% Bayesian confidence intervals from the posterior
distribution.
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Table 3: Log Marginal data densities
Models
No borrowing constraint Borrowing constraint
Modiﬁed Harmonic Mean -1342.001 -1413.831
Laplace Approximation -1340.979 -1413.943
Table 4: Variance decomposition of model without borrowing constraints: 1954Q3 - 2011Q4
Risk Wage Price Monetary Neutral IST Government
premium markup markup policy Technology
Output growth 0.10 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.55 0.11
[0.03, 0.18] [0.01, 0.06] [0.02, 0.07] [0.04, 0.08] [0.06, 0.12] [0.43, 0.65] [0.09, 0.14]
Consumption growth 0.38 0.13 0.07 0.16 0.11 0.12 0.01
[0.22, 0.56] [0.06, 0.21] [0.02, 0.11] [0.11, 0.21] [0.07, 0.16] [0.03, 0.21] [0.00, 0.02]
Investment growth 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.91 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.00, 0.02] [0.01, 0.04] [0.01, 0.02] [0.02, 0.04] [0.87, 0.95] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.60 0.28 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.00
[0.00, 0.01] [0.51, 0.70] [0.20, 0.39] [0.00, 0.01] [0.04, 0.09] [0.02, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours growth 0.03 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.03 0.31 0.09
[0.01, 0.07] [0.16, 0.47] [0.07, 0.27] [0.02, 0.06] [0.02, 0.05] [0.17, 0.44] [0.03, 0.13]
Inﬂation 0.01 0.40 0.38 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.01
[0.00, 0.03] [0.25, 0.55] [0.22, 0.52] [0.02, 0.07] [0.04, 0.09] [0.02, 0.16] [0.00, 0.01]
Interest rate 0.08 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.43 0.01
[0.01, 0.17] [0.08, 0.26] [0.03, 0.15] [0.07, 0.17] [0.06, 0.13] [0.27, 0.62] [0.01, 0.02]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables.
The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian confidence intervals.
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Table 5: Variance decomposition of model with borrowing constraints: 1954Q3 - 2011Q4
Risk Wage Price Monetary Neutral IST Government
premium markup markup policy Technology
Output growth 0.47 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.06 0.04 0.14
[0.43, 0.53] [0.03, 0.07] [0.02, 0.06] [0.18, 0.23] [0.03, 0.09] [0.01, 0.06] [0.12, 0.15]
Consumption growth 0.46 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.20 0.00
[0.40, 0.52] [0.03, 0.08] [0.02, 0.06] [0.16, 0.23] [0.02, 0.06] [0.14, 0.25] [0.00, 0.01]
Investment growth 0.39 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.01 0.37 0.00
[0.31, 0.48] [0.01, 0.04] [0.01, 0.06] [0.13, 0.21] [0.00, 0.02] [0.23, 0.50] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.81 0.15 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.02] [0.76, 0.87] [0.11, 0.19] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.03] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours 0.23 0.32 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.23
[0.12, 0.35] [0.14, 0.49] [0.01, 0.10] [0.04, 0.14] [0.02, 0.09] [0.00, 0.02] [0.10, 0.36]
Inﬂation 0.02 0.43 0.50 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.05] [0.28, 0.58] [0.35, 0.65] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Interest rate 0.40 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.00 0.00
[0.25, 0.55] [0.14, 0.37] [0.07, 0.22] [0.06, 0.13] [0.07, 0.15] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables.
The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian confidence intervals.
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Table 6: Estimation results for parameters and shock processes of model with borrowing con-
straints: 1954Q3 - 2006Q4
Parameter Description Prior Mean StdDev Mean (5% 95%)
α Share of capital N 0.300 0.050 0.323 0.258 0.388
φ Investment adjustment cost parameter N 4.000 1.500 2.633 1.615 3.557
σc Households intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.033 0.976 1.089
σcE Entrepreneur’s intertemporal elasticity N 1.500 0.375 1.307 0.788 1.874
h habit parameter of consumers β 0.700 0.100 0.902 0.871 0.933
hE habit parameter of entrepreneurs β 0.700 0.100 0.836 0.776 0.894
θw Calvo wage parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.824 0.737 0.909
σl Labour disutility parameter Γ 2.000 0.750 0.823 0.380 1.243
θp Calvo price parameter β 0.500 0.100 0.838 0.790 0.884
ξ Capacity utilization parameter β 0.500 0.150 0.204 0.111 0.297
φp Markup (goods) N 1.250 0.125 1.304 1.205 1.403
δw Wage indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.407 0.209 0.602
δp Price indexation β 0.500 0.150 0.210 0.095 0.319
φpi Taylor rule inﬂation N 1.500 0.250 2.128 1.854 2.403
φr Taylor rule lagged interest rate β 0.750 0.100 0.846 0.815 0.877
φx Taylor rule output gap N 0.125 0.050 0.104 0.070 0.136
φ∆x Taylor rule output gap growth rate N 0.125 0.050 0.254 0.217 0.290
π¯ Steady state inﬂation Γ 0.625 0.100 0.832 0.722 0.940
100(1−β)
β
Discount rate (percent) Γ 0.250 0.100 0.246 0.095 0.398
ltv Loan to value ratio β 0.500 0.150 0.540 0.337 0.736
β˜ Entrepreneurs discount less househlds Γ 1.000 0.500 0.993 0.243 1.737
lss Log steady state hours N 0.000 2.000 0.055 -1.932 1.946
γ Steady state growth rate (percent) N 0.400 0.100 0.486 0.457 0.513
ρa AR parameter technology shock β 0.500 0.200 0.964 0.952 0.978
ρc AR parameter risk premium shock β 0.500 0.200 0.814 0.756 0.875
ρg AR parameter exog. demand shock β 0.500 0.200 0.987 0.979 0.996
ρi AR parameter investment shock β 0.500 0.200 0.203 0.128 0.275
ρr AR parameter interest rate β 0.500 0.200 0.096 0.025 0.162
ρp AR parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.947 0.914 0.982
ρw AR parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.957 0.927 0.986
ρep MA parameter price markup β 0.500 0.200 0.881 0.815 0.946
ρew MA parameter wage markup β 0.500 0.200 0.916 0.871 0.964
ρga Eﬀect of tech shock on exog. demand N 0.500 0.200 0.383 0.308 0.459
σc Std dev. of risk premium shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.419 0.361 0.476
σw Std dev. of wage markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.252 0.221 0.282
σp Std dev. of price markup shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.134 0.115 0.154
σr Std dev. of interest rate shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.213 0.191 0.232
σa Std dev. of technology shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.545 0.497 0.591
σi Std dev. of investment shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 2.259 1.824 2.664
σg Std dev. of exog. demand shock Γ
−1 0.100 2.000 0.332 0.300 0.362
Notes: The prior for a parameter is a Normal (N), Beta (β), Gamma (Γ), or inverse-Gamma (Γ−1) distribution.
Columns 4 and 5 indicate the mean and standard deviation of the prior distribution, and the final three columns
report the posterior mean and lower and upper limits of 90% Bayesian confidence intervals from the posterior
distribution.
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Table 7: Variance decomposition of model with borrowing constraints: 1954Q3 - 2006Q4
Risk Wage Price Monetary Neutral IST Government
premium markup markup policy Technology
Output growth 0.48 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.12
[0.42, 0.53] [0.03, 0.07] [0.02, 0.06] [0.14, 0.19] [0.07, 0.14] [0.01, 0.07] [0.10, 0.13]
Consumption growth 0.45 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.20 0.00
[0.39, 0.52] [0.03, 0.10] [0.02, 0.07] [0.13, 0.18] [0.05, 0.10] [0.13, 0.25] [0.00, 0.01]
Investment growth 0.40 0.02 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.39 0.00
[0.30, 0.51] [0.01, 0.03] [0.01, 0.06] [0.10, 0.18] [0.01, 0.03] [0.22, 0.53] [0.00, 0.00]
Real wage growth 0.01 0.76 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.68, 0.84] [0.12, 0.24] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.06] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Total hours 0.16 0.45 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.19
[0.07, 0.25] [0.26, 0.63] [0.01, 0.10] [0.04, 0.10] [0.02, 0.09] [0.01, 0.02] [0.08, 0.30]
Inﬂation 0.01 0.45 0.49 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00
[0.00, 0.03] [0.30, 0.60] [0.31, 0.63] [0.00, 0.01] [0.01, 0.07] [0.00, 0.00] [0.00, 0.00]
Interest rate 0.32 0.29 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.00 0.00
[0.18, 0.45] [0.18, 0.40] [0.09, 0.28] [0.04, 0.10] [0.09, 0.18] [0.00, 0.01] [0.00, 0.01]
Notes: Each column corresponds to the contribution of a particular structural shock to the variance of observables.
The values in square brackets are 90% Bayesian confidence intervals.
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A Linearized Model
Table 8: Linearized model equations
GDP yt =
ca
y
cat +
i
y
it +
z
y
zt + εg,t
Marginal utility c λt = −σ
c 1
1−h
γ
(ct −
h
γ
ct−1) +
σc−1
1−h
γ
(WLC)lt
Euler λt = Et (λt+1 + rt + εc,t − pit+1)
Marginal utility ce λet = −σ
e 1
1−h
e
γ
(cet −
h
γ
cet−1)
Entrepreneur’s Euler λet = λ
e
t+1 + υ (rt + εc,t − pit+1) + (υ − 1)∆t
Borrowing constraint bt + rt + εc,t − pit+1 = qt+1 + kt
Entrep. flow constr. c
e
y
cet +
i
y
it =
b
y
bt +
b
y
RR
γπ
(pit − bt−1 − rt−1 − εc,t−1) + (rkt + kt−1)rk
k
y
1
γ
Consumption agg. c
a
y
cat =
c
y
ct +
ce
y
cet
Investment it =
1
1+βeγ1−σ
e it−1 +
(
1− 1
1+βeγ1−σ
e
)
it+1 +
1
1+βeγ1−σ
e
γ2φ
qt + εµ,t
Tobin’s q qt = ((1− δ)β
eγ−σ
e
+∆χ)qt+1 + (1− (1− δ)β
eγ−σ
e
−∆χ)rkt+1
+∆χ∆t + λ
e
t+1 − λ
e
t
Production fn. yt = φF
(
αkt + (1− α)lt + εa,t
)
Effective capital kt = kt−1 + zt
Capital utilization zt =
1−ξ
ξ
rkt
Capital accumulation kt =
1−δ
γ
kt−1 +
(
1− 1−δ
γ
)
it +
(
1− 1−δ
γ
)
(1 + βeγ1−σ
e
γ2φ)εµ,t
Marginal cost mct = (α)rkt + (1− α)wt − εa,t
Wage mark up µwt = wt − (σ
llt +
1
1−h
γ
(ct −
h
γ
ct−1)
Cost minimization rkt = −(kt − lt) + wt
Price inflation pit =
δp
1+βγ1−σ
c
δp
pit−1 +
βγ1−σ
c
1+βγ1−σ
c
δp
pit+1 +
(
1−βγ1−σ
c
θp
1+βγ1−σ
c
δp
)
1−θp
(θp((φp−1)ǫp+1))
mct + εp,t
Wage inflation wt =
1
1+βγ1−σ
c wt−1 +
(
1− 1
1+βγ1−σ
c
)
(wt+1 + pit+1)−
1+βγ1−σ
c
δw
1+βγ1−σ
c pit
+ δw
1+βγ1−σ
c pit−1 −
1−βγ1−σ
c
θw
1+βγ1−σ
c
1−θw
θw((φw−1)ǫw+1
µwt + εw,t
Interest rate rule rt = φrrt−1 + (1− φr)(φπpit + φx(yt − y
flex
t ))
+φdx(yt − yt−1 − (y
flex
t − y
flex
t−1 )) + εr,t
Note that ∆ is the steady state value of the shadow price on the borrowing constraint; υ = βγ−σc/(βEγ
−σcE );
and ∆t is the multiplier on the borrowing constraint.
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B Data
B.1 Data sources
Table 9: Raw data
Mnemonic Source Description
GDP Haver Gross Domestic Product (SAAR, Bil.$)
JGDP Haver Gross Domestic Product: Chain Price Index (SA, 2005=100)
CN Haver Personal Consump. Expend.: Nondurable Goods (SAAR, Bil.$)
CS Haver Personal Consump. Expend.: Services (SAAR, Bil.$)
CD Haver Personal Consump. Expend.: Durable Goods (SAAR, Bil.$)
I Haver Gross Private Domestic Investment (SAAR, Bil.$)
LF Haver Civilian Labor Force: 16 yr + (SA, Thous)
LH Haver Not in the Labor Force: 16 yr + (SA, Thous)
LXNFC Haver Nonfarm Business Sector: Compensation/Hour (SA, 2005=100)
LXNFH Haver Nonfarm Business Sector: Hours of All Persons (SA, 2005=100)
FFED Haver Federal Funds [eﬀective] Rate (% p.a.)
Note: The Haver mnemonics should be suffixed with @USECON to call the series from the Haver Excel add-in.
B.2 Data transformations
We transform the data as described in Justiniano et al.’s Investment shocks and business cycles:
technical appendix and additional results, with a minor exception relating to nonfarm labour
hours (discussed below). The mnemonics from table 9 are used in the right hand side in table
10.
For per capita labour hours we use the LXNFH series instead of the HNFBN series reported
by Justiniano et al. because the latter series no longer seems to be available in Haver. LXNFH
is an index with a base year in 2005. We normalize our series to replicate the properties of
the series in Justiniano et al..10 In their sample ln(HNFBN/(LF + LH)) appears to have has
been normalized to zero. The Federal Funds rate is divided by 4 because the model is run on
quarterly data. No other demeaning or de-trending is performed on the data.
10The choice of parameters is very slightly modified to those found from regressing the data from Justiniano
et al. on ln(LXNFH/(LF + LH)).
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Table 10: Data transformations
Real GDP per capita = GDP/((LH + LF )× JGDP )
Real Consumption per capita = (CN + CS)/((LH + LF )× JGDP )
Investment per capita = (CD + I)/((LH + LF )× JGDP )
Real wages = ln(LXNFC/JGDP )
Inﬂation at time t = 100× ln(JGDPt/JGDPt−1)
Interest rate = FFED/4
Labour hours per capita = ln(LXNFH/(LF + LH))× 100
Notes: The observables for Real GDP per capita, real consumption per capita, real investment per capita, and real
wages are computed as 100 times the log difference of each of the series described above, ie the log approximation
of quarterly percent changes.
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